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Key Findings
• Low voter turnout at the 2018 Iraqi federal elections (at 44.5 percent) reflects a mal-
aise in the overall Iraqi population and a rejection of the political class that has gov-
erned the country since 2003. 
• Most Iraqis have decided that the old political elite cannot combat corruption or im-
prove government services. They have yet to identify a new political leadership that 
they feel can do so.
• The top two winning coalitions, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun Coalition and Hadi al-
Ameri’s Fateh Alliance did well because they were perceived to be outside the system.
• The split of the historically powerful Daʿwa Party into two meant Prime Minister 
Haider al-Abadi’s Victory Alliance (Iʾtilaf al-Nasr) and Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law 
Coalition (Iʾtilaf Dawlat al-Qanun) did less well than expected. 
• Despite prior talk of post-sectarianism, most Iraqis voted along identity-based lines, 
but the coalitions were more cross-sectarian than in previous elections. The ability to 
mobilise a large portion of the Shiʿa base was key to successful election campaigns.
• Large-scale allegations of fraud marred the elections especially in the Kurdish prov-
inces of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk, and the disputed territory of Kirkuk. The 
subsequent investigation into electoral fraud, while problematic constitutionally and 
tainted by political interests, is a positive trend for the democratic process in Iraq. 
Introduction
On 12 May 2018, Iraqis went to the polls to vote for their next parliament, prime minister 
and cabinet. Compared to the previous elections of 2005, 2010 and 2014, the sectari-
an-based political blocs were fragmented and competed for the same constituencies. The 
election also delivered a surprise, with Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun Coalition (an alliance 
between Sadr’s Shiʿa Islamist followers and the Iraqi Communist Party) winning the most 
seats of any bloc, although not enough to form a government alone. Sadr’s bloc was closely 
followed by the Fateh Alliance, headed by the Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and 
a number of leaders from the predominantly Shiʿa Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). 
Incumbent Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s Victory Alliance placed third. Post-election 
manoeuvering will determine the shape of the next administration, with a broad coalition 
government the most likely outcome.
The elections delivered a number of clear messages about the state of Iraqi politics, not 
least the low turnout and the decision of many Iraqis to boycott the elections, reflecting a 
general malaise and disillusion with the current political leadership and bloated bureau-
cracy. Economic, political and social problems continue to plague the country. Iraqis don’t 
have access to basic services – such as water and electricity – and to jobs. They blame the 
corrupt political system and governing elite for these deficiencies. In addition, millions 
are still displaced, Islamic State (ISIS) followers continue to plan and carry out attacks, 
and political leadership continues to fracture. The latter was evident in the pre-election 
fragmentation of traditionally larger ethno-sectarian-based blocs and the subsequent 
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emergence of new opposition parties. However, the impact on government remains to be 
seen, with the established elite seemingly determined to preserve its prerogative and the 
ethno-sectarian system that underpins it. 
The emergence of new parties split a once-united Shiʿa vote, and Abadi’s decision to run 
members of the established elite against Sadr’s reform candidates contributed to unex-
pected electoral results. Likewise, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Kurds used 
boycotts to express apathy and dissatisfaction with the duopoly of the Kurdistan Demo-
cratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). This abstention – paired 
with electoral irregularities that spurred post-election accusations of fraud – contributed 
to a continuation of the status quo. These outcries were especially notable in the disputed 
territories such as Kirkuk, where the PUK, a party criticised by local Kurds for betraying 
the city by allowing forces from Baghdad to take over in October of last year, won six of 
the twelve contested seats. Allegations of fraud, coercion and intimidation again signal the 
elite’s continued hold on power and accompanying growing civic disengagement in the 
Kurdistan Region.
The elections served as a gauge for measuring the post-ISIS trajectory of Iraq’s politi-
cal class, citizenry and civil society. The revelations of electoral fraud and the very low 
turnout (estimated to be around 30% in Baghdad and even less in Basra) indicate that it 
will be difficult for the political class to overcome its reputation for maintaining the status 
quo – and for the citizenry to accept it.
This report is the second in a series of three produced by IRIS on the 2018 Iraqi federal 
elections. The first, published in May 2018, analysed campaign mobilisation strategies.1 
The final report will be published after government formation. It will look at what the 
composition means for reform and assess political and conflict dynamics.
Iraq
Elections Results
The winner of the 12 May elections was Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun Coalition, gaining 54 
seats. Hadi al-Ameri’s Fateh Alliance (Tahalof al-Fateh) won 47 seats, and incumbent 
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s Victory Alliance (Iʾtilaf al-Nasr) came third with 42 seats. 
Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition (Iʾtilaf Dawlat al-Qanun) won 25 seats, and Ammar 
al-Hakim’s National Wisdom Movement (Tayar al-Hikma al-Watani) won 19 seats. As a 
result, the previously united Shiʿa Islamist vote was split. The leading non-Islamist list Ayad 
Allawi’s National Coalition (Iʾtilaf al-Watania) won 21 seats. Masoud Barzani’s KDP was the 
most successful Kurdish party with 25 seats, while the leading Sunni list, Osama al-Nujaifi’s 
Iraqi Decision Alliance (Tahalof al-Qarar al-Iraqi), won 14 seats (see Table 1).2
1  ‘Iraq Votes 2018: Election Mobilization Strategies’, Institute of Regional and International Studies, 11 May 
2018. Available at http://auis.edu.krd/iris/sites/default/files/IraqVotes2018_MobilizationStrategies1.pdf 
(accessed on 17 July 2018).
2  Sonam Abdullah Khoshnaw, ‘Distribution of Parliamentary Seats in Different Iraqi Provinces’, Rudaw, 
19 May 2018. Available at http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/1805201816 (accessed on 17 July 
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To the Iraqi voter, the priority was not simply to reconcile ethno-sectarian differences, but 
rather to bridge the gap between elite and citizen. As a result, 65 percent of the success-
ful candidates were newcomers to Parliament.3 However, the leaders of the main blocs 
remain the same, challenging the hope for change via elections. 
Table 1. Key Winners of the Iraqi Parliamentary Elections 2018
Party Leadership Seats 
Saairun Coalition Muqtada al-Sadr 54
Fateh Coalition Hadi al-Ameri 47
Victory Alliance Haider al-Abadi 42
State of Law Coalition Nouri al-Maliki 25
KDP Masoud Barzani 25
National Coalition Ayad Allawi 21
National Wisdom Movement Ammar al-Hakim 19
PUK Kosrat Rasul Ali 18 
Iraqi Decision Alliance Osama al-Nujaifi 11
2018); ‘Final Results: Saairoon Alliance Led by al-Sadr Tops Parliamentary Elections in Iraq’, RT Online, 
19 May 2018. Available at https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/944882-ةيناملربلا-تاباختنلا-يف-ادعقم-54-زوفت-ردصلا-ةلتك 
(accessed on 17 July 2018).
3   ‘65 Percent New Faces in the Parliament’, MIQPM, 29 May 2018. Available at http://www.miqpm.com/
new/News_Details.php?ID=364 a (accessed on 17 July 2018). 
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Anbar
Party Seats 
Anbar is our Identity 6
National Coalition 3
Iraqi Decision Alliance 2
Abiroon Coalition 2
Victory Alliance 2
Babil
Party Seats 
Fateh Coalition 4
Saairun Coalition 4
Victory Alliance 3
National Wisdom Movement 3
State of Law Coalition 3
Coalition of Competencies for Change 1
Baghdad
Party Seats 
Saairun Coalition 17
Fateh Coalition 9
State of Law Coalition 9
National Coalition 8
Victory Alliance 8
National Wisdom Movement 4
Iraqi Decision Alliance 4
Baghdad Alliance 4
Others 6
Basra
Party Seats 
Fateh Coalition 6
Saairun Coalition  5
Victory Alliance 5
State of Law Coalition 4
National Wisdom Movement 2
Assembly of the Men of Iraq 1
Movement of the Will 1
Dhi Qar
Party Seats 
Saairun Coalition 6
Fateh Coalition 5
State of Law Coalition 3
Victory Alliance 3
National Wisdom Movement 2
Diyala
Party Seats 
Fateh Coalition 3
Iraqi Decision Alliance 3
National Coalition 3
Saairun Coalition 2
Victory Alliance 1
National Wisdom 1
PUK 1
Table 2. Seat Distribution per Province
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Dohuk
Party Seats 
KDP 10
Islamic Party of Kurdistan 1
Erbil
Party Seats 
KDP 8
PUK 2
New Generation 2
Coalition for Democracy and Justice 1
Movement for Change 1
Kurdistan Islamic Group 1
Karbala 
Party Seats 
Fateh Coalition 3
Saairun Coalition 3
Victory Alliance 2
State of Law Coalition 2
National Wisdom Movement 1
Kirkuk
Party Seats 
PUK 6
Kirkuk Arab Coalition 3
Turkman Front of Kirkuk 3
Maysan 
Party Seats 
Saairun Coalition 5
Fateh Coalition 2
National Wisdom Movement 1
Victory Alliance 1
State of Law Coalition 1
Muthanna 
Party Seats 
Saairun Coalition 2
Fateh Coalition 2
Victory Alliance 1
National Wisdom Movement 1
State of Law Coalition 1
Najaf 
Party Seats 
Saairun Coalition 4
Fateh Coalition 3
Victory Alliance 3
National Wisdom Movement 1
State of Law Coalition 1
Nineveh 
Party Seats 
Victory Alliance 7
KDP 6
National Coalition 4
Nineveh is our Identity 3
Fateh Coalition 3
Iraqi Decision Alliance 3
A Population in Transition? 11 
Qadisiyyah
Party Seats 
Fateh Coalition 3
Saairun Coalition 3
Victory Alliance 2
National Wisdom Movement 1
State of Law Coalition 1
Eradaa Movement 1
Saladin
Party Seats 
National Fortress Coalition 3
Fateh Coalition 2
National Coalition  2
Victory Alliance 2
Iraqi Decision Alliance 2
Saladin is our Identity 1
Sulaymaniyah
Party Seats 
PUK 8
Change movement 4
New Generation 2
Kurdistan Islamic Group 1
KDP 1
Coalition for Democracy and Justice 1
Kurdistan Islamic Union 1
Wasit 
Party Seats 
Saairun Coalition 3
Fateh Coalition 2
Victory Alliance 2
National Wisdom Movement 2
State of Law Coalition 1
Coalition of Competencies for Change 1
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Explaining the Low Turnout
The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) officially placed turnout at 44.52 
percent, which was lower than that of 2014 and 2010 (both at 60 percent). However, to 
many residents in Baghdad, the turnout – at 33 percent –  was still higher than expected.4 
As one civil society activist told the authors, ‘if you would tell me that 1 out of 3 people 
showed up to vote, I would not believe you’. The intention not to vote was clear in the 
mood of many residents prior to the elections, despite the lack of a full-fledged boycott 
campaign. Even Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who previously told Iraqis it was their duty 
to vote, ruled that the decision to participate was that of the citizen.5 This lack of partici-
pation was indicative of the general mood in Iraq, where after 15 years, many citizens had 
lost trust in the post-Baʿathist leadership. 
Evidence of voter unhappiness has been present for some time. The turnout reflected 
to some extent the protest movement. Beginning in the summer of 2015 in Basra and 
then spreading throughout the south and centre, demonstrations emerged demanding 
systemic change to the political system. The movement was inspired by the civil trend, 
which includes a number of leftist, secularists and communist thinkers who have argued 
against the so-called ‘Green Zone elite’ since 2010.6 The fact that the protests erupted 
in the middle of the war against ISIS is indicative of the priorities of many Iraqi citizens, 
who began equating the terrorist to the corrupt leader. Baghdad , the centre of the protest 
movement for the past few years, had the lowest turnout of 33 percent at the elections. In 
Basra and many of the southern provinces, where the movement began, the turnout was 
also lower than the national average.7 As a result, the established electoral lists, namely 
Abadi’s Victory Alliance and Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, lost votes, whereas the Sadrists 
(linked to the protest movement) maintained votes.8
The low turnout is indicative of a gap between the ruling leadership and the population. 
In an election where citizens demanded systematic change, deploying the same elite and 
parties – our previous report argued that over 90 percent of the competing lists were not 
new9 – to seek votes missed the mark. As a result, many Iraqis did not believe that genuine 
change could come from voting for the same leaders.
4   Interviews with residents post-elections in Baghdad. 
5   Renad Mansour, ‘What to Expect from Iraq’s Election on Saturday’, Washington Post, 7 May 2018. 
Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/07/what-to-expect-
from-iraqs-post-islamic-state-elections/?utm_term=.74ec4f1799ee (accessed on 17 July 2018).
6   Faleh Jabar, ‘The Iraqi Protest Movement: From Identity Politics to Issue Politics’, LSE Middle East 
Centre Paper Series 25, June 2018; ‘Sadr–Communist Alliance and Iraq’s 2018 Elections Interview with 
Benedict Robin’, Musings on Iraq, 22 May 2018. Available at http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2018/05/
sadr-communist-alliance-and-iraqs-2018.html (accessed on 17 July 2018). 
7  One author argues that the turnout was as low as 14.4 percent in Basra. See: Matthew Schweitzer, ‘Pro-
tests in Southern Iraq Intensify, Is Instability to Follow?’, The Global Observatory, 24 July 2018. Available 
at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/07/protests-southern-iraq-intensify-is-instability-to-follow/ 
(accessed on 31 July 2018). 
8   Fateh was also able to do well in the south because it was not linked to the ruling class. 
9   ‘Iraq Votes 2018’.
A Population in Transition? 13 
Sadr Outperforms and Abadi Underperforms. Why?
In most public opinion surveys, Abadi was the pre-election favourite, with his alliance 
the choice for 24 percent of Iraqis. Saairun only had 8 percent and Fateh 7 percent of the 
vote.10 What could explain the discrepancy between the polling data and the results? The 
answer lies in the pre-election mobilisation strategies that each leader chose in order to 
best convince the disillusioned voter that his list could bring about change.11 
A main pre-election mobilisation strategy employed primarily by Abadi and, to a lesser 
extent, Ameri, was the stressing of cross-ethno-sectarian policies – or issue-based over 
identity-based politics. Under this strategy and the guidance of international advisors, 
Abadi campaigned in Kurdish and Sunni areas to demonstrate that he was an Iraq-wide 
candidate. However, Abadi decided to run electoral candidates who came from the estab-
lished elite, including current and former cabinet ministers. He could not convince Iraqis 
that the list of establishment elite was serious about bringing systemic change.
In contrast, as the IRIS pre-election report argued, ‘Saairun, inspired by Shiʿa cleric 
Muqtada al-Sadr and the civic protest movement, focused on an electoral base of disen-
franchised citizens. This base seeks systematic change in the political system and includes 
a wide mix of Shiʿa urban and rural lower class citizens, as well as Islamists and secularists 
– all in opposition to the ruling elite.’ 12 Saairun ran the highest number of new candidates 
and focused its campaign messages on change and anti-elitism. Through this strategy, 
Sadr was able to maintain his base by convincing his supporters that he will be able to 
create change. The core of his electoral base also ran a strong get-out-to-vote campaign on 
the day of the elections. As a result, Sadr received a similar number of votes in each prov-
ince as compared to the 2014 elections.13 The low turnout hurt his opponents however, 
allowing him to gain an extra 20 seats with the same number of votes.14
Fateh also benefited from the anti-establishment vote to a varied degree. Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq, 
for example, went from 1 to 15 seats because it was seen as non-establishment; whereas 
Badr maintained the exact same number of seats because it was seen as establishment. 
Fateh’s focus on members of the PMF, their families and the families of martyrs, made it 
the most popular group amongst the Shiʿa Islamist electoral base. This included a pitch to 
help returning fighters find employment.
Ultimately, the decision came down to a leader who could bridge the gap between Shiʿa, 
Sunnis and Kurds, versus a leader who could bridge the gap between citizen and elite. For 
many Iraqis, the latter was more appealing.
10  ‘Results of a Nationwide Public Opinion Poll on Iraq’s Upcoming Parliamentary Election’, 1001 
Iraqi Thoughts, 1 May 2018. Available at http://1001iraqithoughts.com/2018/05/01/results-of-a-nation-
wide-public-opinion-poll-on-iraqs-upcoming-parliamentary-election-2/ (accessed on 17 July 2018). 
11   ‘Iraq Votes 2018’.
12   Ibid. 
13   ‘65 Percent New Faces in the Parliament’.
14   Ibid. 
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Implications for Government Formation
The most critical impact of the fragmentation of the different blocs is the lack of an out-
right winner, with no list able to form a majority government, even Sadr still requiring 
111 seats. As a result, the government formation process necessitated compromises with 
other established elites, hurting Sadr’s promise for change. For instance, weeks after the 
vote, on 7 June, Sadr entered into a government formation alliance with Allawi’s National 
Coalition and Hakim’s National Wisdom Movement.15 Then, days later, on 12 June, Sadr 
reached a government formation alliance with Ameri’s Fateh.16 This move upset several 
Sadrist supporters who hoped for a new trajectory away from the established elite. Sadr 
also continued to engage with incumbent Prime Minister Abadi’s alliance.17 The reality 
of government formation reveals that any leader must compromise in order to form a 
majority government. The consequence of this process is a number of compromises that 
put promises of change and bridging of the gap between the rulers and the ruled at risk. 
This is why Sadr’s party offices were attacked in Babil during the protests that swept the 
south of Iraq in July 2018. 
Iraqi Kurdistan 
The KRI was not spared protests against the ruling elite prior to the elections. Indeed, after 
the failed referendum on independence last year and subsequent demonstrations against the 
backdrop of widespread financial hardship and accusations of corruption and maladminis-
tration, the duopoly that has run Kurdistan since the early 1990s was expected to face tough 
competition.18 However, due to patronage networks and a determination to hold power, the 
two government parties performed relatively well while the opposition lost ground. The 
results also show a Kurdish population ‘in transition’ that is increasingly rejecting the old 
parties but also unsure of, apathetic towards or not ready for, the new opposition. 
Results
Kurdish parties won a total of 60 seats in Iraq’s 329 seat parliament in the 2018 elections. 
Sixteen of the seats are for representatives from Erbil, eighteen from Sulaymaniyah and 
15   ‘With Proof: The Agreement between Saairoon and the National Wisdom Movement’, Al Sumaria, 7 
June 2018. Available at https://www.alsumaria.tv/news/238777/ (accessed on 17 July 2018). 
16   ‘Press Conference by Muqtada al-Sadr and Hadi Al-Amiri’, YouTube, 12 June 2018. Available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=m7ylRUL3rhM (accessed on 17 July 2018). 
17   ‘Abadi Meets Sadr in Najaf ’, Al Sumaria, 23 June 2018. Available at https://www.alsumaria.tv/
news/240049/ (accessed on 17 July 2018). 
18   There were widespread protests in Sulaymaniyah province in December 2017, violently suppressed by 
security forces (see: ‘Protests rage in Iraqi Kurdistan’, DW, 19 December 2017. Available at https://www.
dw.com/en/protests-rage-in-iraqi-kurdistan/a-41868334 (accessed on 18 July 2018)), and in Sulaymani-
yah, Erbil and Dohuk in March 2018, also violently put down by security forces (see: ‘Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq: Protesters Beaten, Journalists Detained’, Human Rights Watch, 15 April 2018. Available at https://
www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/15/kurdistan-region-iraq-protesters-beaten-journalists-detained (accessed 
on 17 July 2018)). 
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twelve from the Dohuk province. Kurdish parties won fourteen seats in the disputed territo-
ries, a decline of two seats from 2014 and a result of the KDP’s decision not to run in Kirkuk. 
Electoral lists in the KRI for the 2018 federal elections were dominated by the usual players, 
the KDP, the PUK and oppositionists Gorran. Newer ‘protest’ parties, such as Barham 
Salih’s Coalition for Democracy and Justice (CDJ) and Shashwar Abdulwahid’s New Gen-
eration (NG) contested the poll, seeking to capitalise on widespread discontent in the 
Kurdistan Region. However, pre-election expectations that Gorran, CDJ and NG would eat 
into the support of bigger parties failed to materialise, with all performing less well than 
expected, though serious allegations of fraud cast doubt on the veracity of this ‘failure’. 
Salih, a reform-minded former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and Prime Minister of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), split from the PUK in August 2017 after three 
decades with the party, to form CDJ, whose broad goals are good governance and eco-
nomic reform.19 Abdulwahid is a Sulaymaniyah-based real estate developer and head of 
Nalia Group, which owns NRT TV station.20 It was known to be a mainly independent 
outlet over the years, and provided an important challenge to the mainstream KDP and 
PUK media outlets. 
As with previous elections, the KDP and the PUK won in the provinces under their respec-
tive control. The KDP received the most votes in Erbil and Dokuk, where they maintain 
large electoral bases and extensive patronage networks. Similarly, the PUK led the vote in 
Sulaymaniyah; votes for the PUK tripled in the governorate of Halabja despite the party’s 
unpopularity there for years.21 Of the opposition parties, Gorran came in first with five 
seats, NG in second with four seats, and CDJ in third with two seats. The Islamic parties, 
the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) both lost 
seats (see Table 3). 
19   CDJ’s Facebook page (in Kurdish) is the largest source of information on the political party, available 
at https://www.facebook.com/hawpaimani/. See also an interview with Dr Rebwar Karim, the spokesman 
and head of the list in Sulaymaniyah for federal elections, available at https://www.iraqoilreport.com/
news/qa-rebwar-karim-mahmood-of-the-coalition-for-democracy-and-justice-party-29415/; and the 
following articles: ‘Barham Salih Elected Head of CDJ, Pledges to Fight Corruption’, Rudaw, 10 January 
2018. Available at http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/100120185; ‘Coalition for Democracy and 
Justice Pushes to End Corrupt Ruling System in Iraq’s Kurdistan’, Middle East Online, 22 January 2018. 
Available at https://www.middle-east-online.com/en/coalition-democracy-and-justice-pushes-end-cor-
rupt-ruling-system-iraq’s-kurdistan.
20   For more information on New Generation’s political platform, see Shaswar Abdulwahid’s home-
page, available at http://shaswar.net/default.aspx; and ‘New Generation “Naway Nwê” Political 
Platform Announced in Iraqi Kurdistan’, Ekurd Daily, 2 October 2017. Available at https://ekurd.net/
naway-nwe-political-kurdistan-2017-10-02 (accessed on 19 July 2018).
21   Christine McCaffray van den Toorn, ‘Was Iraq’s Recent Election a Democratic Success? Depends 
who you ask’, Washington Post, 23 May 2018. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/23/was-iraqs-recent-election-a-democratic-success-depends-who-you-
ask/?utm_term=.f0bbb1be83cc (accessed on 14 July 2018).
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In the disputed province of Kirkuk, the PUK surprisingly held on to all six of their seats, 
despite losing control of the city to Iraqi forces in October 2017. The loss of the city further 
impaired the KRG’s economy as the oil-rich city had served as its economic backbone, 
and was expected to cost the PUK votes in the 2018 elections.22 However, the PUK won 
183,283 votes, a gain of 26,681 from the 2014 elections.23 
Table 3. Seats Won by Kurdish Parties in 2010, 2014 and 2018 Elections
2010 2014 2018 Difference 2014–2018
KDP 26 25 25 –
PUK 17 21 18 -3
Gorran 8 9 5 -4
NG – – 4 +4 (new)
CDJ – – 2 +2 (new)
KIU 4 4 2 -2
KIG 2 3 2 -1
Low Voter Turnout
In the KRI, widespread disillusion with establishment elites, recent political failures, ter-
ritorial losses and economic mismanagement affected turnout levels. All governorates 
in the KRI experienced lower voter turnout than in both the 2010 and 2014 elections. 
Turnout plunged from around 70 percent to just over 40 percent in Erbil and Kirkuk, and 
to 50 percent in other provinces (see Table 4).
Table 4. Elections Turnout by Province in the KRI in 2010, 2014 and 2018 Elections
Year 2010 2014 2018 
Sulaymaniyah 73 percent 72 percent 50 percent
Erbil 76 percent 70.6 percent 43 percent
Dohuk 80 percent 73.9 percent 51 percent
Kirkuk 73 percent 65 percent 40 percent
Nineveh / Mosul 66 percent 49.4 percent 53 percent
22   Even though Kirkuk is traditionally a PUK area, the KDP gained two seats in the city in the 2014 elections. 
23   ‘Distribution of the Winners in the Elections of the Iraqi Council of Representatives 2014’, Iraq High 
Electoral Commission, 2014. Available at http://ihec.iq/ihecftp/ntaij2014/karkook.pdf (accessed on 17 July 
2018).
A Population in Transition? 17 
More than anything, voting patterns reflect an electorate in transition of which a majority 
decided not to vote for traditional elites but was also not yet willing to throw its support 
behind new parties. Of those who did not vote, IRIS fieldwork showed that the most 
common reason was a strong feeling that voting would not change the political status 
quo. Many Kurds believe that the PUK and KDP will continue to maintain power through 
formal and informal means, such as security, intelligence and border forces, as well as 
private sector businesses, in addition to a wide patronage network of political and familial 
ties. Anger towards politicians and parties perceived as corrupt, combined with the view 
that neither opposition parties nor civil society groups had the ability or leadership to 
usurp the power of elites through democratic processes, drove low voter turnout.
In addition, the voting patterns show a population divided between old – tribal, patron-
age-based, nationalist politics – and new – focused on jobs, education and reform. The 
‘old’ predominantly vote for the PUK and KDP, and many for Gorran, though some likely 
abstained or switched back to the PUK since Nowshirwan Mustafa’s death in 2017. The 
politically active ‘new’ have voted for Gorran en masse, but now also cast ballots for CDJ 
and NG. Those that are not voting are stuck in between. While they did not vote for the 
opposition parties, and whether they do depends on the opposition’s ability to mobilise 
in future elections, they are unlikely to go back to the traditional elites. 
Anywhere from 60 to 70 percent (combining those who did not vote and those who voted 
for the opposition parties) of the Kurdish population is no longer voting for the PUK 
and KDP, which is significant. Attitudes among the boycott vote range from outright and 
deep anger towards the ruling elites for their corruption and failure to govern, to a more 
passive rejection of their rule. That said, the KDP and PUK maintain and benefit from 
their historic, core, loyal bases sustained through extensive patronage networks, as well as 
traditional, steadfast tribal and familial connections. 
Growing feelings of discontent are also directed at opposition parties – both as a result of 
their inability to implement their reform agendas and efforts by ruling parties to under-
mine the leadership of opposition parties. The status Gorran once enjoyed as a reformist 
party, for example, has declined as a result of their failure to meet the expectations of many 
of their Kurdish supporters. Similar sentiment is evident towards CDJ. A number of factors 
contributed to its low vote, including its late formation, just months before the elections, 
and perception that if Gorran and Nawshirwan Mustafa could not use his opposition party 
to improve the opportunities of Kurds, it is be unlikely that Salih’s party would. 
In a similar ‘new vs. old’ vein, many Kurds hoping for fresh faces still viewed Salih as a 
PUK establishment figure and wondered how his party could make changes he had been 
unable to make as both Prime Minister of Kurdistan and Second Secretary General of the 
PUK. Both Gorran and CDJ struggle internally with the divisive dynamic that plagues the 
wider population. New Generation, whose image resonated with the youth angry at the 
establishment and hoping for a non-establishment figure, attracted some votes. Shaswar 
Abdulwahid was a new face to politics, was liked for his more pointed and targeted attacks 
on the elites, as well as his anti-referendum stance. Votes for NG showed people desperate 
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for something new, but he too was tainted by accusations of corruption in past business 
dealings, and widely criticised for running with PKK-affiliated groups, and even delivering 
them their first seat in Iraqi Parliament.
Allegations of Fraud
While low voter turnout in the KRI explains much of the results that favoured traditional 
parties with loyal core bases, the large discrepancies between results for the status quo 
vs. opposition parties and allegations of widespread electoral fraud have led many in the 
Kurdish public, opposition leadership, Iraqi federal government24 and in the international 
community25 to believe there was foul play. 
As soon as the polls closed, reports of small-scale fraud and intimidation, as well as 
larger-scale fraud evidenced by irregularities in new electronic voting machines and the 
misuse of old biometric cards resulted in national calls for a recount. Kurdish opposi-
tion parties submitted formal complaints to the IHEC in the weeks after the elections,26 
calls that were echoed by members of the international community, most significantly 
UNAMI,27 and contributed to the decision to implement a partial recount. 
Small-scale fraud and intimidation appear to have ranged from cash handouts to physical 
intimidation and threats, with civil servants and local security commanders instructed to 
vote for PUK and KDP candidates or risk losing their position and placement. 28 Wide-
spread violations and irregularities were reported on the day – in over 80 percent of 
polling stations – by the independent monitoring organisation, the Kurdistan Institute for 
Elections (KIE).29
In the Nineveh and Dohuk provinces, reports claimed that the KDP intimidated and 
coerced internally displaced people (IDP) voters in camps, and tampered with and even 
discarded hundreds of ballot boxes.30 In rural areas and locations with high populations 
24   Raya Jalabi, ‘Iraqi PM Abadi Says Election Fraud Allegations to be Investigated’, Reuters, 24 May 2018. 
Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-election-fraud/iraqi-pm-abadi-says-election-fraud-
allegations-to-be-investigated-idUSKCN1IP2Z2 (accseed on 16 July 2018).
25  UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, ‘UN Special Representative Kubiš calls on IHEC to promptly and 
thoroughly investigate all complaints concerning the electoral process’, Reliefweb, 17 May 2018. Available 
at https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/un-special-representative-kubi-calls-ihec-promptly-and-thorough-
ly-investigate-all (accessed on 18 July 2018). 
26   IRIS Interviews with Gorran, CDJ electoral offices (May 2018); Campbell MacDiarmid, ‘Angry Iraqi 
Kurds file election complaints with Baghdad’, The National, 22 May 2018. Available at https://www.then-
ational.ae/world/mena/angry-iraqi-kurds-file-election-complaints-with-baghdad-1.733005 (accessed on 
18 July 2018).
27   Ibid.
28   IRIS interviews in Sulaymaniyah, Ranya and Kirkuk (May 2018), as well as election research con-
ducted during and after 2014 federal elections. 
29   ‘Monitors Final Report on the Iraqi Council of Representatives Elections’, Kurdish Institute for 
Elections, 19 May 2018. Available at http://kie-ngo.org/newdesign/wenekan/421012252018_KIE percent-
20monitoring percent20Report-Eng.pdf (accessed on 12 July 2018).
30   IRIS interviews with IDPs and locals in Ninewa and Dohuk provinces (May 2018). 
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of IDPs, ruling parties were also accused of intimidating displaced Iraqi families to vote 
for Kurdish parties.31 
Voters and parties alleged more large-scale fraud across the KRI. Multiple cases of irregu-
larities suggest electronic vote tampering through the pre-programming of machines and 
flash drives, and tampering with the online transmission of data. Reports from collection 
centres and polling stations, including by members of the IHEC, allege that machines 
that counted ballots were pre-programmed to give particular parties more or less votes 
than had actually been cast.32 A report by IHEC member Saad Kakeyi found discrepancies 
between results that were transmitted and results reported on flash cards.33 A Kurdistan 
Institute for Elections report found that 80 percent of stations and observers were not 
allowed to watch how data was transferred with flash drives.34
Opened ballot boxes showed sustained discrepancies between manual counts and elec-
tronic tallies. Manual counts also revealed thousands of duplicate ballots. There are multiple 
centres and stations where candidates voted that have no record of any vote for them. In 
Kirkuk, the same five candidates received the same number of votes at multiple stations.35
Moreover the new biometric cards system that was introduced appears to have been 
abused, with over a quarter million voters in Sulaymaniyah not receiving their new cards,36 
while others used old cards to register multiple votes.37 The old cards were supposed to be 
moved to an IHEC office in Baghdad, but opposition parties accused the KDP and PUK of 
hiding them in order to create the allegedly fake national ID cards.38 
The introduction of new biometric cards and reports of their manipulation also suggest 
electoral fraud that an election monitor from Kurdish Human Rights Watch (KHRW) 
described as ‘widespread’.39
31   See for example Kristina Bogos and Mohammed Fatih, ‘“Our Voices will go Unheard”: Displaced 
Iraqis Claim Threats on Election Day’, Middle East Eye, 23 May 2018. Available at http://www.middleeast-
eye.net/news/electoral-fraud-iraqi-krg-leave-displaced-iraqis-want-greater-representation-1325167018 
(accessed on 14 July 2018). 
32   IRIS elections research conducted in May and June 2018 in the provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and 
Kirkuk.
33   Al Sharqiya TV, ‘With One Letter: Once Again, Serious Information is Documented Episode 1’, 
YouTube, 20 May 2018. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TWtpchNYxt0&feature=youtu.
be (accessed on 17 July 2018). 
34   ‘Monitors Final Report on the Iraqi Council of Representatives Elections’, Kurdish Institute for Elections, 
19 May 2018. Available at http://kie-ngo.org/newdesign/wenekan/421012252018_KIE percent20monitor-
ing percent20Report-Eng.pdf (accessed on 18 July 2018); Al Sharqiya TV, ‘With One Letter’.
35   IRIS elections research conducted in May and June 2018 in the provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and 
Kirkuk and extensive interviews with electoral offices of Gorran and CDJ.
36   ‘More than 268 Thousand People in Sulaymaniyah will not Have the Chance to Vote’, Peregraf, 11 May 
2018. Available at http://peregraf.com/political/535 (accessed on  July 2018). 
37   Interviews conducted in Sulaymaniyah with head of CDJ and Gorran election offices (May 2018).
38   Ibid. 
39   The monitor from Kurdish Human Rights Watch stated that, ‘the process started slowly from the 
beginning because the devices did not start working on time. They entered the codes multiple times until 
they started operating. Then the IHEC employees voted. There were two issues. Some IHEC employees 
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Recount, Recourse?
With both opposition parties and PUK claiming to deserve more votes than received, a 
sampling of  ballot boxes have now been recounted in all provinces of the KRG but results 
have not been officially released.40 It remains to be seen what comes next in the process 
and what the outcome will be – whether there will be a further recount or new elections, 
and whether any seats will change hands. While the process and outcome should follow a 
legal process, it is certain that politics and political deal-making will ultimately determine 
whether the campaign to expose fraud will continue, and whether seats will change hands. 
The process will be a key test of the KRG’s legitimacy and the strength of opposition in the 
region. A manual recount is not without its own problems, but the key will be whether it 
changes the results in any substantive way, and whether the Kurdish population accepts 
the final results. Given the extent of the fraud allegations, simply confirming the results 
is likely to heighten popular discontent with, and disengagement from, politics. However, 
for the two main parties, any confirmation of fraud – and implicit political weakness – is 
likely to be seen as the beginning of a slippery slope. 
Conclusion
Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections reflect a nationwide fatigue brought on by years of 
corrupt politicians, inefficient bureaucracy and a lack of faith in civil society’s ability to 
restore political and economic agency to citizens. In the months leading up to the elec-
tions, political gridlock plagued the country despite Prime Minister Abadi’s declaration 
of victory against ISIS. Internal political squabbles fractured major political parties whose 
leaders’ were marred by accusations of corruption, sectarianism, political scandals, or, in 
the case of the KRG, turning ‘Kurdish’ lands over to Baghdad. Growing public awareness 
of the vast economic divide between the general population and political elites who prom-
ised – but failed – to deliver reform contributed to the high abstention rate. 
Unmet expectations of basic service provision, such as water, electricity and public 
healthcare, especially in regions such as Basra and Kirkuk, whose lands offer oil wealth but 
whose populations complain of unfair redistribution of revenues, culminated in boycotts 
of both establishment and opposition parties. While there was some mobilisation around 
reformist candidates and opposition parties, the overall mood – even among many citi-
zens who did decide to vote – was one of disaffection. 
While abstention rates were high nationwide, outcomes differed between federal Iraq and 
the Kurdistan Region. In Baghdad, election results came as a surprise, defying pre-election 
were told that they only were allowed to vote from 7:00 am to 8:00 am. But some others believed that 
everyone should start voting from 7:00 am. Here [Sirwan Voting Centre] between 7:00 am and 8:00 am, 
only IHEC employees voted. Other problems that we faced were that some people who attended did 
not have their electronic cards, therefore couldn’t vote. Their votes will not be counted. The electronic 
cards of some others are not readable by the machines, so they were able to just sign and vote.’
40   Interviews with Gorran and CDJ officials (11–12 July 2018). 
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predictions that incumbent Prime Minister Abadi’s Victory Coalition would have decisive 
success, given his popularity following the defeat of ISIS and reacquisition of disputed 
territories from the KRG. Nevertheless, his party came in third, behind a coalition whose 
leader had reinvented himself as a reformist, and another who benefited from martyrdom 
rhetoric and victories against ISIS.
While new parties competing in non-Kurdish areas did indeed benefit from their choice 
of non-establishment figures, the effect in the KRI was the opposite. Despite the existence 
of several opposition parties, including some who emerged less than a year before the 
elections – notably CDJ and NG – the abstentions ultimately benefited the ruling parties. 
Nevertheless, accusations of fraud through ballot stuffing, misuse of new voter technol-
ogy and intimidation remain particularly acute in the Kurdistan Region, and the recent 
recount shows that fraud may indeed be responsible for the comparatively high levels of 
support for KDP and PUK.
The low voter turnout, unexpected victories and ongoing accusations of fraud and cor-
ruption outlined in this report reflect not only the disenchantment Iraqis feel towards the 
current political process and its leaders, but also the challenges faced by new MPs and 
cabinet ministers in restoring public trust. Despite lofty campaign promises to eliminate 
corruption, the patronage networks upon which many political leaders rely – both inside 
and outside Iraq – paired with the challenge of negotiating competing ideologies, policy 
platforms and priorities, offer just a peek into the uphill battles the next government 
will face.
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Appendix
Table 1. Votes and Seats Distribution in Sulaymaniah
2014 Votes 2014 Seats 2018 Votes 2018 Seats Votes Difference
KDP 93,410 2 48,820 1 -44,590
PUK 294,265 6 267,442 8 -26,823
Gorran 347,799 7 156,973 4 -190,826
CDJ 46,967 1
NG 64,339 2
Komal 57,102 2 51,763 1 -5,339
Yegertu 81,392 2 30,297 1 -51,095
Table 2. Votes and Seats Distribution in Erbil
2014 Votes 2014 Seats 2018 Votes 2018 Seats Votes Difference
KDP 354,735 7 321,883 8 -32,852
PUK 168,688 4 79,727 2 -88,961
Gorran 104,059 2 40,914 1 -63,145
CDJ - - 50,561 1
NG - - 70,848 2
Komal 80,492 2 36,855 1 -43,367
Yegertu 24,564
Table 3. Votes and Seats Distribution in Dohuk
2014 Votes 2014 Seats 2018 Votes 2018 Seats Votes Difference
KDP 340,977 8 353,177 10 +12,200
PUK 37,457 1 25,575 -11,882
Gorran – – 3,797 – 0
CDJ – – 25,656 – 0
NG – – 18,026 – 0
Komal – – 3,483 – 0
Yegertu 84,464 2 43,417 1 -41,047
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Traditional vs. Opposition Parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Table 4. Sulaymaniyah 
Traditional Parties Opposition Parties
Total Votes 2010 350,283 404,770
Total Votes 2014 387,675 404,901
Total Votes 2018 316,262 320,122
Change 2010–2014 +37,392 +131
Change 2014–2018 -71,413 -84,779
Total Seats Won in 2018 Elections 9 9
Table 5. Erbil 
Traditional Parties Opposition Parties
Total Votes 2010 458,403 166,103
Total Votes 2014 523,423 184,551
Total Votes 2018 401,610 199,170
Change 2010–2014 +65,020 +18,448
Change 2014–2018 -121,813 +14,619
Total Seats Won in 2018 Elections 10 5
Table 6. Dohuk 
Traditional Parties Opposition Parties
Total Votes 2010 332,951 –
Total Votes 2014 278,434 –
Total Votes 2018 379,000 50,218
Change 2010–2014 -54,517 _
Change 2014–2018 +100,566 +50,218
Total Seats Won in 2018 Elections 10 1
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Table 7. Kirkuk 
Traditional Parties Opposition Parties
Total Votes 2010 206,542 –
Total Votes 2014 273,040 20,000
Total Votes 2018 183,283 13,775
Change 2010–2014 +66,498 +20,000
Change 2014–2018 -89,757 -6,225
Total Seats Won in 2018 Elections 6 0
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